

CUBA

Aftermath:

- 1) Thygesen sent revealed to VCS on Nov 5;
revealed to ISA, State, WH, & height of crisis,
27 Oct (Saturday) (Entomom writing memo for
President on Sat & Sunday). little attention.

Also, N-N attitude in Nov. "I'll take care of it."

Also, UK-US cooperation with cooperation over Berlin.

(Kagan away on India).

- 2) US ^{Proposed} affirmed request for Butin leaked to come to
NAC on week following Cuban crisis.

Consider. events leading up to Cuba as a failure of
"communication", distorting, inference (SU misreading of
US response; US misreading of SU intentions, estimates,
actions. Warning is successful, accurate, truly
inferred (+ prediction), and, failure of attempt to prevent.

(Does crisis warrant confidence in efficacy of warning,
affording lessons of failure to avert crisis or recognize it?

reversion of course, ... over, under

Sievert Aug 27, '63

History

[How sure were we that we would attack?
What made us sure?

How improving was blockade? JFK speech?
How worried was he on 23 Oct? Would
blockade have been more, less?

[If SA-2 shooting of U-2 was unauthorized — how
much did it worry K? JFK?
If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, how much did it
worry JFK? K?]

[Black Box problem: why did nations take the
observable actions they did? Under what circumstances
would they act the same — or different?]

Not enough data, experience for inputs-output study —
besides, inner structure changes. So, need look at the works.]
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (improving) OUTPUTS OF THE PROC?

[Did SU think that "the problem" was to get
some missiles on island — not, ^{by plane} ^{"inspiration"}
prior to detection? Explain difference in SU move
to Cuba, US move to Turkey; why didn't latter create
crisis? What responsible acts might we do?]

Would SU think it important to ~~get~~ postpone
detection by a few days or weeks — even they were
there? What if they had — as that our first
look showed ready missiles?

Why would readiness have made us willing to attack?

How important in supporting our response was a US
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable
to US, indefensible?]

"Missile reports in August: either linked to SAM or
missile, or shown incorrect.

[Were there false plans in Aug. 1st
from intell analysts, or would be refugees?]

Suggestive reports after mid 1st:

- 1) specific zone in Pinar del Rio heavily guarded
by Suro, Cuban division.
- 2) oral comments by Castro side: we have in BCCI and
" " " " : some strong weapons.
- 3) " " " " : some strong weapons.
- 4) sighting of truck coming with what looked like MRBM.

Early 1st: restrictions on mission, based on DCI instruction
that there should be greatest possible photo wing.

Aug 31 - 1st: instruction on use of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct - Oct 11: instruction on IL-28's.

Oct 12: ²² special class system.

[Suro: "oral analysis" 1st given after mid-1st; 1st 13 special]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ "tension", fear of 'incidents' that would heighten

tension & raise prob of crisis (not quite believed

to be high) → constraint on 3) info-gathering

(U-2 recon, ship movements) → delayed recognition of problem
increased impact of "surprise"

and on 4) alert, readiness.

[What if SALT had been detected,

even threatened, prior to Oct 14?

consider dependence on photos.]

→ decreased readiness,

flexibility

→ increased vulnerability

Both increase chance of a fait accompli

[Anyone seeing it a fait accompli can

should win at these efforts. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of that

on 2) recon, 4) readiness.

SALT?

U-2 over China; U-2 over Sakhalin

34th Aug 30?

WHAT IF THESE HAD HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Might have seen U-2's on flight; but might have taken
agent reports more seriously: maybe on overflight, 29, Sept 20?

[Notes concerning of Santa flight being first when
it was — not later — coroner!]

[What would have been difference of Vess things to constraints
on clouds cover?]

Sept 10: See notes objection to Carter flight plan extension
preferred + one flight (cont + actual, cover) ^{to look for} _{more 2/1/15}
instead 4 flights, lower

[Why no proposal to look again at west end?
Assumption on spread of installation?] [SAMP?]

[Also mission on 10th cancelled? Why?] [Where?]

^{over NE}
Flight for 16th delayed then cancelled for weather. Over Paris.

17 Sept: Unusable photos. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown when weather good. 4 days before takeoff.

Between Sept 5 — Oct 14, 5 scheduled missions cancelled
for bad weather over target; no other flown, but absconded.

[Did Base Committee foresee this problem?]

Mission started to cover Base from 22-26

Flight program completed Oct 7.

Flight stop: mostly SA-2 to find out if operational?

Found N list - Oct 2, reports noted suspicion

among analysts of ARRR west of Moscow

Cost "published"?

[Why not checked out immediately?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both

Oct 4: McE argued for extensive overflights

[Why did his suspicion stand?] Special Group requested

study (by NARCON Off, JCS, COM) of alternative means of recon,

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear

report (see ?); planned flights: bad weather on 10-13 & 14.

Why does CIA plan create issue of overflying international waters, but SAC peripheral mission does not?

[How did weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 missions flown — compare to ARRR Oct 2-14?]

among
Informant Oct 15. McC, K. Spetner, Connolly, Taylor,
- Aub, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Halenon, McC,
Carter, Baily. [P. 1, 2]

Johnson? Kasper, Kasper?
[Early? Johnson? Who else was actually told?
What did they do? Talk about? Feel? First
responses? Did they know & expect JFK to be told?
Bridges? Jones? Why tell them but not JFK?
How unusual was this?

Johnson?
At first meeting, were Johnson, Robinson, Nitze, South Africa?
What decisions, other than more reason? Bay? Responses?
[What can be inferred about responses if news had
been different?]

[If photos had revealed after, circles in charts, with
wordbooks - immediate in that night would have
been observed - Johnson - would have been, with books doubt
[Why? How come?]

Wednesday: meeting without Paul (who left in afternoon)

One of first suggestions (what?) : treat like U-2 in 1960

("should" have been treated) : a "mistake" to be "corrected"
"extremely"
by limited air strike.

[Could ^{we} have done? How fast? How?]]

[Did K feel that that operational status of weapons
would influence us — that early discovery would make
us more willing to act?]

Rhetorical (?) question (what?) : Why not just accept
mistake? (NOTE: this would support our retention of
ABRIS in Italy, if we wanted that! Any nation?]

[Our position on Cuba depends a lot of keeping out
because of any prediction of this?]

[What access to Oral History interviews or tapes on Cuba]

Early estimate of strike (W405E?): 50 sorties, 75
bombs for H2B40, rather 100 sorties for refuels,
100 for SAR. Mission needed 2000 sorties, 4000 bombs.

Thurs. ^{morning} Pres: 2 groups, "cler." & "post." [W40?]]

[Cler. not formally ally of Pres; no blockade.]
if open? MROMS
JFK decision: Pres could not be accepted.

Thurs. aft.: without Pres.

We in strike: danger to other countries; to Houston;
moral points of striking without warning, particularly as
it bore on the inevitable (?) Cuban civilian casualties.

[Any thought to demonstration attack?] [Chen?]
[JCS opposed this on 16 Oct]

Blockade regarded as more suitable, provocative,
than limited air strikes against missile sites. (10-2-1960)
[How does that look now?]. Johnson had called

blockade "act of war" on Oct. 6. But could
attack instead like "incident": [pretext by Germany?]
"U.S. destruction" [ready?] Response from Berlin
could be "right not to make an issue" [! ?]
(Thursday)
Wednesday photos: none visible.

Friend to blockade.

Thursday at 5: "inner life" of his country for
settlement of German question; important, no progress on
Berlin.

[No touch on Berlin — as reported?]

G. instructed to make it clear that to Cuba was only
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability
of Cuba [act, defensive purpose?].

FK: no threat of invasion. To Cuba; would have been
glad to give assurances to that effect if K had asked.

[So: guarantee was no new concession?]

G: Does specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling
certain kinds of defensive arms [they were operating
NR000, SAMs]

Unknown Did G know and know? Phil DeBryen did not
know.]

Friday night: both lines of action (blockade + large
scale), "even games" at State & Defense. (How? WHO?)

Shapiro worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper over weekend

Final drafts of speech written by Garrison. (Pres.)

Sat. morning: Johnson arrives in Munich (Pres.)
(Johnson?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Stevenson, Shapiro, Smith.

Discussion: large; almost certainly loss + follows
with invasion (?); Cuban civilian casualties would
be high. Strongly conceivable loss would not require
SEE

militarily JFK plan as presented was "not surgical,"
was "apt to go" (Cage?) require massive commitment

Question was "only course of action compatible with
our principles. Only a small risk the world 'pull the
bandage'."

|| Evening: JFK talked to Hore. Later, to Macmillan.
(New York: just then)

No benzene or benzene, unless basis of problem

If construction continued, might be necessary to strike
with minimum basis, and if SAC would retaliate, info.
since SAC sent.

If receiving ^{information} makes war, made against US, it might
be necessary to invade, but not to use force against Cuba;
however, it might be necessary to make a compensating
strike on SU.

[Any planning? Analysis?]

Sunday morning.

Till 10, when final approval to plan, possibility
we would plan with strike.

2:30 NSC, with Anderson

(after dinner!)

[How common was "scenario" approval? Did]

A. Johnson invent this?

Monday

11:33 meeting of Excom
Pols - message to J. F. Kennedy

5: formal meeting of NSC (McDonough)

established Excom - avoid appearance of hesitancy,
sing one song

Hypothese of not saying strike or invasion had been
considered (as rejected):

Why no preventative action? Lack of "hard" wisdom
to convince this ; & opinion of experts that SC
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - air strike, invasion

(Cov. Taylor, McN first view?!))

Macmillan reply to Soviet Embassy, 6 Monday: it must not
not so much on precedent as on unprecedented condition of
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for retali. action against Cuba, is not!
as person or weaker part of the Free World defense system.

Monday night:

[First mt. Post - DeLoach talk, 22 Oct.]
- thoughts,

10:40-11:45 McH and Anderson.

and briefing on nuclear weapons. (?)

Tuesday morning:

Post to Ball: We've won a considerable victory;
you and I are still here. [Did Post believe this?]

[Mentally: Bundy & SFC did not; issues were
not immediate subcommittee, but shipping road.]

[Why did SO perceive in long presence of misadventure?
What did this "convoy" to us?]

Excomm: 10: 3 subcommittee. Berlin, advance planning.
comm.

Putze. comm. for inter-allied relationships.
check with her

Disadvantages of not telling allies they would not be
able to tie our hands, & would be free to himself

Worries

^{in Wilson's own}

Fear that Mac would force JFK to engage
against some course of action

(Graham?)

Tuesday: Memo for JFK (via Post): Taylor, Talbot & Posters

annual support for MRBM to Europe; privately

urge Jinks to place out position as soon as MLE----

available? predictable? Represents by Exotic Area to

desires from duplicating MRBM to Canada on ME (but, MLE?)

SEE

7 per Proc. of Introduction

8 per McN said 25 per ships enroute to Cuba,

this course unchanged [TRUE?]

in post 24 hrs.

Friday morning: 10. From (with Stevenson) (Adrian?)

Work on minutes continuing. E. [Plot former chart
of low crisis]. An idea discussed.

Does still proceeding.

Deal of Formin + Scali; dominantly under UN supervision;

bridge by Castro not to accept offensive exception (?)

Also; bridge by US not to invade.

Scali, Adrian, Perk. (Chart. Immunofold?)

Scali - Formin 7:45: real possibilities, time short.

Also, Perk at UN and by low. Adrian to Adrian.

[W44?]

Letter began writing at 6; had been translated
by US into in Moscow. [so, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if announced by Perk, and if plot recalled, this would
immediately change everything thereafter, the question of the
distinction, not only of the Adrian which you call offensive.

but of all other armaments as well [!] would
be different.

If armaments were given by the Pres and the gov.
of the US that the US itself would not participate
in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from
actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet,
this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking
for Fidel Castro, but of that that he and the gov. of
Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor.
Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if
there is no threat, the armaments are a burden for every
people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of
the armaments which you call offensive, but of all the
armaments as well, would be different.

Between the four above statements like wisdom I propose:
we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Cuba, will not carry any kind of demands. You would
declare that the US will invade Cuba with its
"force" and will not support the any sort of force which
might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in
Cuba would disappear.

Exposure recovered at 10 pm to dawn.

Agree to treat as bona fide offer. Drafting in reply at
State and WH. (Re action of Berlin, or Turkey,
though, no explicit offer to remove; suggested Castro's consent
needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult to
demonstrate for US)

[Did Nitzze, Rostow know?]

as for blockade, mobilizing US aircraft also (?) or a possible air strike.

Sit morning

Excom at 10. Discussing draft reply [check]
Mendible, Radio Moscow letter: offer to remove;
Tully, inspection.

Albion 2nd (check time): U-2 shot down.

U-2 surplusing (has figlets scrambled). Within hour,
fire on plane. Castro vowed to shoot down plane.

[S419 system] [when?]

Hopes dashed.

[When: JFK attacks on Ritz, Sunday]

Decision by Pres: pick out of earlier letter basis for
solution against Castro.

Excom at 4: consider proposed replies.

2 planes fired on. Pres. approved two messages to C
letter sent at 8:05 pm.

Note that night, message to Khrushchev: call NAC.

Excom at 9: discussion of additional steps next day: such
as POC blockade, mobilizing US merchant ships (?) or a possible air strike.

UNC

11-3-57 (18 Dec 57)

Probable Intell. Warning of Soviet Attack on the US

[Alternatives, threats, as: warning
conditional prediction of one's own intention
^{statement}
evidence of conditional decision
(Would threaten under such
circs, give odds that he would
carry it out? Does he
expect to?)

[Play to get Khr. to do A, which others don't want to do:
get them to agree to threaten to do A if third party S
does & doesn't to Y; get them to commit, US prestige, etc.
Then $pr(A) \equiv pr(S \text{ will lead to do it, etc.})$ — what may be
higher. "If you don't come up to 20 days supply,
we'll come down."

[Thus, reflect the fact that doing A not only hurts US
but also hurts S, whom we wish to influence.]

- [The danger of explosion in crisis confrontations rests partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theories as to the "inevitable" course of events or the nature of the opponent or the "possible" alternatives. Cf: "dangerous theories"

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war - lesson)
(Explosive theories). [Mobilization - War]
[Inability to tell apart from total war] [When did Iran "decide" on war?]

Possibility of warning: What happens — as to possible enemy plans, courses of action, goals, values, will evidence be related to? intent

(also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty: given instruments, what is probability that X has occurred, given a report, over channels, that X has been observed by means A ? Then, what is $pr(H_i | X)$?

UNC

To interpret SU moves (preparation, deter, threats, insurance, decision to attack — "How likely do they feel it is that they will attack?

Or, that war will occur?

To identify long-odds bets — things they would do only if prob of war or attack were high: then try to observe them: a) with high prob b) with high confidence in observation; c) early.

[This "unequivocal" indication can be valuable without (a), given (b) + (c).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied moves that may have triggered (French planes in corridor) SU "response." To identify possible "signals" in advance, so as to monitor or suppress, know

- 1) Our operations, intentions;
- 2) SU collection sources (prob prob > 2);
- 3) SU model of our behavior; hypotheses they are testing, and likelihood functions. Their likelihood functions, "interpretations" of weight of evidence, might depend on "level of tension."

5. What led K finally to withdraw IL-28's?

What if guarantee had been lifted earlier?

36 Note effect of K failure to consult Castro before 28 Oct

on SU-Cuban relations; & SU later difficulty in

extricating IL-28's.

DD/I Remark Staff: ^{7th} Low Minde Base Venture in Cuba

ORR Cuba 1962: K's miscalculated Risk 13 Feb 64

CRISES

1. Interpretation of motive from choices must take account of all factors in decision-theory analysis (at least): utility, probs, (cost risk).

e.g. SU knew US would see in Cuba; but how much risk of US military action could they accept?

12-3. When did K conceive intention? (late '61? or early '60?)

2. How did Soviet attitudes change during study?

What hopes were rejected? Why? What info was not available earlier? What conclusions were likely then?

3. When did Congress/newspaper reports of missile start (before mid July?) (early Sept.?)? How synchronized with actual events?

^{McLone}
4. Alas they may: SA-2's to prevent overflight, protect missiles.

NO: abort perhaps 1 or 2 SA-2 sites (in East
ABM/ACEMs ^{Aug '63} ^{thing?})
5. Has SU ever pretextual against U-2 recon? How much can be inferred from lack of effort? (Failure to proceed with SA-2's is more significant. :))

6. Photos as confirming, establishing validity of, info from other sources. [Analyze role of photos as evidence: for hypotheses suggested/generated by other means.]

7. As info, note distinction between comm and electronic emanations. (latter, too, can be 'comm' — as well as 'information'.)

8. Background/context: SU and to others: nature + scale. ^{+ thing.}
Indonesia, Iraq, Egypt

9. Collateral reports of construction, etc. in first half of '62 not supported by photos. What conclusions?

2) Reports could not be "basis for assuming"...

3) But were they without basis? (Probably not: perhaps based on knowledge of personnel, not detected by photos)

1) c) Did availability of photos, then, "reduce info available to govt"?
(compared to info available to those without clearances?)

10. Why were missiles transported clandestinely: but not constructed covertly?

11. CHART various time-tables.

12. Correlate: US public statements

Congress/news assertions

but guesses, estimates

actual

various kind of evidence

} RAND?

13. Compare McN intell briefing to Congress.

14. Why omitted to peripheral recon of on 5 Sept? How did

(all 14 Nov)

Arban / Sarno probably interpret this? (They were aware).

What was attitude/interpretation of this by US military? Still?

Why resumed on 14 Oct?

Have they ever been activated previously? Practice in
dog, etc.
" SA-2's could have been activated before 14 Oct; could
have been activated by mid-left in west: to screen from
recon.

16. Did 5 left mission cover later sites west of Havana?

17. Implications of extreme mobility/flexibility of SA-2 (MRBM)
systems for US planning, inference.

18. How did SU deployment practice in Cuba with SA-2's
MRBMs compare to practice in SU & elsewhere? How does
this affect inferences made from SU data?

(Concomitancy; lack of rearming; field operation...)

(variation in rearming; $> \frac{1}{2}$ never rearm).

19. Analogy: dependence of an SA-2 site on acquisition by other sites & EW, to raise it from standby condition so it can react fast enough (can't stay in firing condition more than 20-25 minutes); this limits capability for independent action.

(But U-2 is slow enough so individual missile can react; also, does height ~~then~~ increase radius of SA-2 coverage?)

20. Implications as evidence of lack of photo confirmation (e.g. of SA-2 missiles on launcher) when there was no photo coverage.

21. Aug. 5 showed activity at 2 sites but negative on many others (aerial on those not covered); on Aug 27 (?) many seen already in place. Most of these had had gaps in coverage of 23-61 days. W/f?

22. In studying linkage of crises, for some the Bay of Pigs must have been a key element in forming attitudes. What?

23. See Horvitz's group on reorg. of photo recon after Cuba.

To what does Unger attribute delay in maturing the J-3, JCS operations — and the final improvement?

24. Compare analysis of SA-2 deployment ("revealed values") to Heymann study of 1959. What is explanation?

(Question not equivalent to "What was 'their' goal?")

Analyze difference.)

Note redployment on "reflection"

— after crisis [IS THIS WHY/WHEN 'REFLECTION' OCCURS?]

25. SAMs in west replaced by first work in Sept.

26. KEY 'EVIDENCE':

- a) Ability to ^{deploy or} operate SAMs earlier, ^(than MRBMs) and failure to do so.
e.g. (by delaying IRBM site construction + MRBM deployment by weeks; instead of starting 1 1/2 months before AD system activated on 27 Oct).
- b) Ability to conceal deployment in Cuba (for longer) + failure to try.
e.g. by delaying introduction of unique equipment: missiles, fuel + oxygen trailers.
- c) Failure of SU to prepare ^{operational} ~~war~~ capability to use SA-2s to prevent recon. or to defend MRBMs.
- d) Activation of SAM radar + C & C units on 26-27 Oct: not sooner, and then apparently sooner than planned; Moscow links on 23-24 Oct. ignoring of Cuban military comm system.
- e) IRBMs increased image of SU threat to US.

27. Note dramatic emergence of SAM radar on 26 Oct +

AD C & C on 27 Oct. (known to whom, in gov? public?)
How interpreted at the time, in US? How long to
analyse? How related ~~to~~ by Pace, ~~others~~ to shooting
of U-2 on 27 Oct? How was latter interpreted by
various people at time?

28. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from U-2 flights (as distinct from preventing U-2's, or speeding deployment) possible? (IRBM sites particularly hard to conceal? Then why not delay starting them?)

29. Lack of covertness as indicating low prob of US response, in SU minds.

(Were they indifferent to nature or timing of US non-military response?)

30. SU also ignored Pres warnings on 4 Sept

(NOTE: overflights stopped on 5 Sept, after threat of "gravest issues" if offensive missiles found).

13 Sept. during interview.

[What were WH-Pres expectations during this period? Staff background of these statements?]

31. Lack of identifiable missile activity at time of 4 + 13 Sept statements: so SU could not (did not?) interpret Pres statements as based on knowledge + industry acceptance.

(13 Sept. first report of MRBMs approaching Cuba, below date (why?))

32. Ambiguity of failure to alert:

a) Hostilities not feared

b) Situation very delicate, fear of effect of alert - as - info (bad message), assuming it would be seen.

(Failure to carry out actions SU would be sure would not be observed, less ambiguous).

c) People in charge of alerting not in a problem.

33. SU protection against ground observation: vs. US, Cuban, would public (Cuba outside Havana off-limits to reporters 25 Sept.)

34. SU origin of plan probably not till late '61; final commitment to start (?) probably not till April-May '62 (evidence?). Shipments left beginning of July: decision could have been as late as May.

Probably Early preparation in Feb-March, perhaps on contingency (or exploratory) basis.

35. Report in Jan '62 that K intended to complete production of missiles this year — to resolve Berlin.

36. Analyze how missile move would have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany.

37. Relation to SO decision to build up in Indonesia (Feb-April '62 decision); possible commitment there of Sov forces against NATO member (Holland) if conflict in West New Guinea. Study?

38. Castro assertion of authority over "old Coms" in March-April '62: assumed stable political climate (?)

39. 5018

Compare to US.

39. SU leaders ending to reduce strategic misdeeds (?) imbalance
against SU drastically & rapidly. with (4) IRBM sites,
SU would have been more than 50% increase over end-62 levels.

40. How much — and only — would SU now have
discredited US resolutions, will to resist? (Power
beyond US bargaining power). Role of US public
statements. What could have affected this?

Also: 1) substance
(in various cases) } of SU military power.
image: to

2) deterrent to US } in SU eyes
attack on Cuba } in Cuban eyes

3) demonstrate support to ally

4) dissuade Chinese criticism

5) if line of retreat, leverage (focus of attention) for
removal of US subsidies base.

(if role of K's statements in handling Cuba in Dec 61
is creating a problem for him, given our solidarity). K's
commitment, failed to deter; SU K's

40. SU news high rate of US ICBM/Polaris activation
to start in '63, swamp effect of Cuba.

So, temporary gain.

41. Note K statement on 12 Dec 62: 20% of all aircraft
of SAC on air alert.

20 Nov - announcement of withdrawal of 21-28.

42. SU option from 22-28 Oct: insure crisis did not escalate:

test US resolve

if US firm, salvage

43. No reference to K-JFK letters: same, 26 Oct letter
as interpreted in JFK public reply. Did study have access?

44. 31 Oct: SU says to limit ON inspection of sites.

Laos
Remstedt [Hidden episodes — Log of Page,
Turkey — can lead to important — but erratic,
unlinked, & unknown to others — 'learning' by
some participants; and to "increase ration" by
them that are concealed from Ores.]

[How much to allow know of Turkey? CINCO?]

Questioning

Crisis is an acute, urgent, search process:
(search for issues, identification, recognition,
categorization); high level search for a solution
or best alternative
a program; testing inadequacy of currently
currently programmed actions. (The "exception" is referring to
exception)

1) Was situation — challenge + inadequacy —
foreseeable? Was there a failure of anticipation?

2) Was a more adequate response attainable
earlier, so that currently, urgent search process
would not have been necessary?

(Contrast with situation when: "We saw the coming, and we
knew what to do (so it still looks best & good enough)")

Note how different operational life of "crisis" lead
to same situation; dimensions are highly correlated.

Why?

['Wishfulness' can affect any element in decision
framework: hypotheses considered, actions perceived,
consequences, likelihoods

5) Alerting process: in different agencies; plans,
^{usually to}
actual use, actual execution

7) Termination Phase; the payoff

10) Survey Postcrisis problems

e.g. ^{?)} effects of leaving left agencies, public
allies in dark

b) effects of ad hoc org, by-passing

c) neglect of other problems (Slywolt)

d) role of these effects in setting up a new
crisis, dynamic linkages

e) ^{crisis} demobilization; budgets

f) political impact: effect on issues
image
votes

g) new personal relationships with

allies, enemies, staffs

(dist. left out of Liberman planning)

Mac in Cuba, K in Cuba

Tasks (e.g. Bennington) ...

1) Tabulate interacting linkages : instances, and classes, & sequences of couplings between agencies in a crisis : initiatives, requests for info, approval, action, manning, statements, comments

Summary: By-passing, slip-education reporting,
ad hoc change, use of "non-professionals"
WHY? EFFECTS? FUTURE?

2) Alluvial linkages

3) Every linkage.

(43) Search for "should-have-been" crises: "Missed" crises: Hungary, Berlin Wall; Takeover of Prague, 1939.

4) Search for "night-lane - been criss" - l. 3.

internal crises. "accidents" accidents. How/why were they prevented?

Are all "real" crises failures? none thy preventable?

5) Tabulate supracosts: kinds impact, reasons.

6) *Tabulate uncertainties, double effects (final resolutions).*

7) Strategic planning within gov; use of checklists, SOP's. OVER

Are there little-known crises, or unstudied crises,
that repay study? (E.g. ones the crises that
failed to be prevented; hence, invaluable of surprise,
consideration independence.)

Questions:

1) Do you feel that crisis studies you have
seen have systematically left out important factors —
distorted, left gaps etc?

2) What are factors likely to seem important to
top people and be unknown to lower? Inside/outside
— E.g. domestic political; diplomacy.

3) How many goals sought by leaders differ from those
one would infer from the inputs — dis. cables,
int. etc., — and from what outsiders & subordinates can
see?

4) How has your own experience in crises changed your
views from earlier ones? (as to the nature of crisis
problems.)

5) How experience in one crisis directly influenced your view of another?

Marshall

Did SAMs lead to fear of "incidents"? Was that a
fear of the US public reaction, being "exposed"
forcing Cuban into action it felt unnecessary +
unadvisable.

Like the unwillingness to release Further Report.

What would have been our reaction to a shutdown
(accompanied, say, by a public pro denunciation of
flight, recognition of Cuban sovereignty: wouldn't this
have been in rules of the game?

Black Box

Kramer: All anyone but top level sees are

misses going in (some of them) and misses going out.
cables, still, etc.

e.g. they see Ith 3rd in the vicinity and then

Ith 3rd - the actions, directions...

What really goes on inside the Box? What
really worries the President or the Top Staff? What
do they feel uncertain about, & concerned about? (And in
retrospect, were they right to focus on those?)

Why is it important to see within the Black Box

General: problem was how to keep Israelis & Egyptians from
fighting.

Cypres how to keep Greeks & Turks from fighting.

["No one was worried about Sars coming in."]

Calson expresses: "No one - including me - believed that
Sars would do such a thing. There were reasons for calling
off noon - including weather - but none of them would have

been enough if 'anyone' had thought there was a real chance of
firing missiles." EAS AT PEARL HARBOR OVER

Turkish missiles: McN first proposed to get them out
much earlier than 1 April. ^{over} RK helped stretch out
till Polaris back — bang — arrived on scene,
so it was a "small net victory" — gain. (?)

"But — how does Pres get the system
moving? How does he show he really wants something?

He wrote the strongest cable I've ever seen, in 1954:

'I want the ROK Army reduced by 6 divs — not 3
or 4 or 5 — and I want it in 6 months.'

Green Bottom, ROK Army reduced by 60,000 men.

"How much of our reaction to Inuy was caused by
monumental figure at our office for having the gall to
carry out that operation without consulting us, covertly,
attempting to conceal & deceive us?"

26 March

Notes: JFK's greatest confidant, unless RFK, was Gore;
friend since 1938; Gore's sister was Kathleen K's
best friend (KK killed in plane crash); Kathleen married
Gore's best friend's cousin. Gore wanted to write memoirs,
for fear of impression. What was JFK doing, telling such things
to a Briton?

Interagency Post-Mortem Study *

ACDA - Larry Holmes *

1 version of Southard - McG, RFK

Pres just wouldn't do anything but pictures.

RFK reaction on seeing pics on 15 Oct:

"I know what these are. Oh, shit!"

McN: informed only by "hard" int: photos, SI, ...

"Agent reports 'aren't evidence.' ("just opinions, guesses...")

[On camouflage: were nits, etc. just for protection against attack, not photos? i.e. did SC assume that infrared would be used in photo recon?]

[But they wrong. "Cuba 1962" study apparently
aimed to refute it. Has McE admitted
his assumptions?]]

Increasing frustration of intell. analysts, last week
in Sept; agents' reports ignored at State, was on
speculation.

[How do people think, now, "I was wrong."
e.g. KSR recalls that about Aug 30, at WH,
he among others reacted to pics of SA-2's: "Aha,
that's what they're seeing. People who have never
seen a missile before would think this was a big
missile." He assumes now he was wrong; there
were both. But there werent; MRBMs did not come in
till mid-Sept.

Problem of Mistaken Revaluations: Wrong Reasons."

24 March

W's:

Agent reporting: more of it in front work in Sept reporting
objects bigger than SA-2's [even they connect?]

Even more in Sept:

State wouldn't pay attention.

Around 5 Sept: order to USIB to "cease speculation
on missiles in Cuba." [Why? JFK & RUK just
didn't want to be bothered by this stuff?]

[Note: last flight 5 Sept. Because ~~SA-2's~~ SA-2's in?

To avoid "incidents"? Because JFK now
convinced that only SA-2's were involved?] [SAC-EIA
fight?]

[See McC primed, agent testimony.]

McC's theory conviction, as soon as he heard of SA-2's
(late August): "Why SA-2's? To shoot something high.
What's high? U-2's. Why shoot U-2's? To prevent
observation of something serious. What's serious? MRBMs."

Held to the conviction; if he had been beet, views would
have had more impact.

~
Highway bridge July 25

SAM sites: first activity Aug 5; first units seen upland by
last Oct 16; system activated & open 6-67 Oct.

One unit deployed 26 Oct -

Forward force: camp seen west Aug 29; occupied Oct 16

MSPM: No visible activity, Aug 29, Sept 6; first known -

IRSI site: first visible activity Aug 29 (recognized?)

IR-23: first known activity Sept 28

[No mention of evidence outside Cuba, e.g. in
SV, letters to Oros; informal channels (disruption?)

No mention of evidence of activities outside Cuba to Cub
actions (e.g. to air alert) (as in East Germany)

No mention of evidence of EIC plans of responses to
C actions.

No evidence of activities

as to intentions.

Limitations of photos: only 33 MRBMs identified - Cuba
before observation of 42 being withdrawn.

Not known whether missiles & missiles ever material
at any.

Not known whether any simulated launch exercises
involving erection on launcher (could have occurred
before first coverage or at night!).

Full rifle corp. would have required 48 missiles.

Probably ~ 42 IRBM sites (4 under launchers) claimed:
24 + 16.

Kryazev - Litvinov 5 Nov; K to Brit. Int. Police 72 Nov;
said warheads had been removed.

Nov purpose in Nov. was to reassure US that offensive
missiles were being withdrawn; statements that warheads not
present would not have shown. (?)

22,000 Sovs on 22 Nov: most common set.

SAM deployment to give island-wide cover, not
max protection of military sites.

Redeployment by early '63.

Most in west explained by first work in Sept;
could have been sp. But no evidence they were
retrained individually or as part-system till 26 Oct.

First missiles on site about 18 Sept (assume 16 Sept),
last miss 16 Oct, on site 19 Oct.

Others: 22, 23 Sept, 2-3 Oct, 6-8 Oct, &

If workbooks, virtually certain some missiles could
have been launched from one or more sites by
the sites first identified 14 Oct, and that some
could have been launched from all⁶ by 23 Oct.

No evidence of effort to alert or "break" any part
of MRBM ^{in Cuba} force during crisis.

[Study says nothing of attempts to mislead
Poles on intent or actions. ?]

more than 200 reports of missiles in Cuba prior to
Jan '62. Also reports of construction & equipment in
spring '62 in areas where SAM sites located later; but
photos failed to reveal.

But, reports may have reflected low personnel radars
planning, preparation
associated with buildup that began by mid-July
in late July. Because my base generated reports
(wrong) of activity.

[Timing ? for preparatory actions to lead to
reports that will be disproven, discredited later,
true reports.]

[Agents may report inferences, predictions, as facts.]

No previous indication that low level forces brought
to front status prior to 22 Oct, nor that subsequently
they were placed in position suggesting hostilities were
imminent.

In late Oct, prob. during & after 22nd Party Congress.
Oct, prob. reaffirmed in light of Vienna in Jan '61,
Berlin Wall in August [Bay of Pigs? South America],
acceleration of myth of low KGB activity in Oct,
mounting econ problems, controversy with Chinese.

Intention to establish a military base in Cuba probably
had origins in policy deliberations of that time; final
commitment prob. not till spring.

K may have felt that US understood "rules of the
game" — trade bases on agreements properly are facts of
great power life, not provocation to war.

[& no asymmetry]

Assembly of IL 28's went on slowly but steadily
all mid-Nov.

Although ^{not} aware of US action at least by
July '62, and so after, they didn't rush to complete
40 systems or parts. Probably goal-date of first half of Nov;
not intended to screen buildup.

Armed units entered between first week in Sept.
- mid-Oct. Can't tell whether by mid-Sept.

Indication that Sov leaders regarded risks as low.
Could have — but didn't — plan buildup as significant
operation in which defenses screened offensive weapons
or minimize time between first identifiable GRM risks +
the readiness of whole system.

Ignored possibility of US overflight. Choice
inevitable (?) unless Sov leaders (?) judged confidently
that US would acquiesce, or not react militarily — so its
poss. of US detection was not critical to success or failure.

One cruise missile unit deployed ^{on west} operationally, from
inland location, about 25 or 26 Oct;

one armored group moved out of aircraft at
same time.

27 Oct. U-2 shot down, probably by SA missile.

(Cause can't be determined)

Oct: all or virtually all 416-21 continued based
at same airfield where assembled; no really high level
of activity, not dispersed till first week in Nov.

No discernible activity at 3 of 4 ground force
aircrafts, where armored groups remained highly
vulnerable to attack. Korean boats also inactive.

By 1 Nov Sino Sars had begun dismantling.

Some indications of deliberate effort by Sars to demonstrate
as clearly as possible that missiles & bombs were gone.

(No attempt to shelter; IRBM also dismantled; cooperated in
pulling back tanks at sea when challenged.

22-28 Oct

in Cuba

Some actions taken to improve combat readiness, but most of them not till several days after Pres. speech, and then appear to have been earlier than intended; and other elements of Sov forces showed little or no change in status.

~ indecision & confusion?

* Most immediate action [in Cuba] was establishment on 23 + 24 Oct of two direct command comm. links between Moscow + Cuba. (primitive? No realer operation till 28 Oct) &

* AD system operational 27 Oct; however? expanded steadily after.

At sites, construction continued; some training?

Vehicles + equipment dispersed + camouflaged; AAA positions + trenches prepared. May have been occasioned as much by low-level recon starting 23 Oct as by Pres speech, for low-level mission must have expressed some at the sites until the danger of attack.